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THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT RULE:
AMELIORATING THE HARSH RESULT OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, South Carolina courts have been asked to adopt a rule that would
effectively toll the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases when a
patient has remained under the care of her physician.' The principle is known
as the "continuous treatment rule." The rule provides that when the doctor is
engaged in a continuing course of treatment with the patient because of the
nature of the patient's illness or injury, the statute of limitations does not
commence until that treatment has ceased or been terminated.'
Many courts have adopted the continuous treatment rule as an exception
to the traditional rule in which the limitations period begins on the date of the
negligent act or omission. This judicial exception was first addressed by the
Ohio Supreme Court in 1902.? In Gillette v. Tucker, the Ohio Supreme Court
had to determine at what point the statute of limitations began to run-the date
of the surgery or the date that the physician ceased treating the victim.4 The
Gillettecourt held that using the surgery date as the starting date for the statute
of limitations would improperly burden the victim by forcing her either to sue
the surgeon while her treatment continued or forego her cause of action.'
The importance of the continuous treatment rule increased after the
medical malpractice insurance reform of the 1970s. At that time, decisionmakers reacted to a perceived medical insurance crisis by enacting legislation
aimed at curtailing a rise in medical malpractice insurance premiums for
physicians and other health care providers.6 Some of the studies indicated that

I. See Preer v. Mins, 323 S.C. 516, 476 S.E.2d 472 (1996); Anderson v. Short, 323 S.C.
522,476 S.E.2d 475 (1996); Dunbar v. Carlson, 341 S.C. 261,533 S.E.2d 913 (Ct. App. 2000).
For the purpose of this Comment, the application of the "continuous treatment rule" is limited
to medical malpractice cases. However, South Carolina courts have contemplated the doctrine
in other professional negligence claims. See Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 332 S.C.
247, 258,503 S.E.2d 787,793 (Ct. App. 1998) (declining to apply the continuous treatment rule
to toll the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim).
2. 1 DAVID W. LOUISELLETAL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 13.02[3], at 13-48 (2000); see
61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,Surgeons, Etc. § 320 (1981 & Supp. 2000); 54 C.J.S. Limitationsof
Actions § 174 (1987 & Supp. 2000).
3. See Gillette v. Tucker, 65 N.E. 865 (Ohio 1902).
4. Id. at 869.
5. Id. at 871.
6. Robert W. George, Comment, Prognosis Questionable: An Examination of the
ConstitutionalHealth ofthe Arkansas MedicalMalpracticeStatute ofRepose, 50 ARK. L. REV.
691, 697 n.31 (1998).
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between 1960 and 1970, "insurance rates for surgeons rose 949.2 percent [and]
rates for nonsurgical physicians increased 540.8 percent."7 Legislators used a
variety ofmethods to avert the crisis including limiting the amount ofrecovery,
capping liability, and shortening the statute of limitations.'
At the time ofthe perceived crisis and in retrospect, commentators argued
that the insurance panic "was grossly exaggerated." 9 Not only had the severity
of the crisis been inflated, but the purported causes had been expanded beyond
the presumed litigious sources." Some argue that insurance companies raised
premiums in an attempt to cover stock market losses." Regardless of the initial
causes of the increase in premiums, many state legislatures reacted to the
perceived crisis and enacted tort reform schemes that placed "the brunt ofsuch
reform on those least able to bear its burdens-future medical malpractice
victims. ' 12
This Comment explores and discusses present jurisprudence regarding
statutes of limitations, medical malpractice claims, and the "continuous
treatment" rule and evaluates whether South Carolina should alter its uncertain
position to provide more just results and a predictable guideline. Part II reviews
the case law and statutory schemes of other jurisdictions that have addressed
the continuous treatment rule, while Part III discusses the history behind South
Carolina's position. Finally, Part IV addresses possible problems and
complexities that South Carolina may face by adopting or declining the
continuous treatment rule, includingpolicy concerns andpossible constitutional
challenges.
II. APPROACHES TO THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT RULE
A. Adoption of the Continuous TreatmentRule
Though Dunbar v. Carlson3 did not take a position on the continuous
treatment rule, the court recognized the equitable results of the continuous
treatment rule. Many courts have been reluctant to create another express

7. Martin H. Redish, LegislativeResponse to the MedicalMalpracticeInsurance Crisis:
ConstitutionalImplications,55 TEX. L. RaV. 759, 759 (1977).
8. Id. at 761.
9. Howard Alan Learner, Note, RestrictiveMedicalMalpracticeCompensationSchemes:
A Constitutional"Quid Pro Quo "Analysis to SafeguardIndividualLiberties, 18 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 143, 144 (1981).
10. Id. at 144-45.
11. Id. at 144.
12. Id. at 147. On the other hand, some jurisdictions have incorporated the continuous
treatment rule into the applicable statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims. See
Sheldon v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 300 N.W.2d 746 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
13. 341 S.C. 261, 533 S.E.2d 913 (Ct. App. 2000).
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exception to the statute of limitations. 4 However, a number of jurisdictions
have explicitly addressed the doctrine.' s
One of the first states to adopt the continuous treatment rule was New
York, which adopted the rule in 1923.6 Later, New York incorporated the
continuous treatment rule into its applicable statute of limitations.17 In Borgia
v. City ofNew York, the Court of Appeals of New York explained that "at least
when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions
has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint,
the 'accrual' [of time] comes only at the end of the treatment." 18 The Borgia
court justified its holding by stating the 'continuous treatment' [rule] is the
fairer one" in part because a patient should not be made to "interrupt corrective
efforts" of the caregiver.19

Even though the New York courts accepted the doctrine, the New York
legislature expanded the doctrine in the 1970s by providing an exception to the
statute oflimitations based on equity.20 Section 214-a ofthe Consolidated Laws
of New York states that an action for medical malpractice must be commenced
within thirty months "of the act, omission or failure complained of or last
treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or
condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure."'"
Unlike New York, the move toward adoption of the continuous treatment
rule in otherjurisdictions has been neither quick nor easy. For example; inLane
v. Lane' the Arkansas Supreme Court finally accepted the continuous
treatment rule in 1988.' The Lane decision was a shift from the previous
position taken by the Arkansas court and considered "a major liberalization"
of the Arkansas statute of limitations.24 Before 1988, the Arkansas court
interpreted the date of the accrual of the course of action to mean the time of
the first injury giving rise to liability.'

14. See, e.g., Williams v. Edmondson, 520 S.W.2d 260,267 (Ark. 1975) (holding that the
General Assembly is the proper entity to decide the adoption of the continuing tort theory as it
relates to public policy); see also discussion infra Part H.B.
15. See Farley v. Goode, 252 S.E.2d 594, 599 (Va. 1979) ("The approach we adopt in this
case has been embraced by a number of other courts.").
16. See Borgia v. City of New York, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778-79 (N.Y. 1962).
17. See Dana David Peck, Comment, The Continuous TreatmentDoctrine: A Toll on the
Statute of Limitationsfor MedicalMalpracticein New York, 49 ALB. L. REv. 64, 65 (1984).
18. Borgia, 187 N.E.2d at 778.
19. Id. at 779.
20. See Peck, supranote 17, at 87.

21. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-a (McKinney 1990).
22. 752 S.W.2d 25 (Ark. 1988).

23. See id. at 28-29.
24. John D. Nichols, Arkansas Adopts Continuous Treatment Rule to Toll Statute of

Limitations in MedicalMalpracticeActions, 11 U. ARK. LrrLE RocK L. REv. 405,412 (19881989).
25. See Steele v. Gann, 123 S.W.2d 520 (Ark. 1939).
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Arkansas courts historically deferred to the legislative intent behind the
statute when declining to adopt the discovery rule or the continuing tort
theory. 6 In Lane the Arkansas court reconciled the difference in the statutory
language with the adoption of the continuous treatment rule by relying on the
reasoning of the Virginia Supreme Court.' The Lane court recognized that
Virginia adopted the continuous treatment rule and "adhered to the 'time of
injury rule."' 2 s In Farley v. Goode29 the Virginia Supreme Court held that a
patient's claim for dental malpractice was not barred by the statute of
limitations even though the tortious acts began outside the time limitations of
the statute because the events surrounding the injury should be examined in
their entirety since "'the whole transaction was inherently negligent.""'3
Currently, the statute oflimitations for medical malpractice claims in Arkansas
is two years, and the statute provides that "the date of the accrual of the cause
of action shall be the date of the wrongful act complained of and no other
time.'
Connecticut has also adopted the continuous treatment rule. Claims for
medical malpractice in Connecticut are governed by Connecticut General
Statute section 52-584.: Claims must be brought within two years ofthe injury,
or discovery of the injury, but no more than three years from the date of the
tortious event.34 Even though the time limits in the Connecticut statute are more
restrictive than the comparable South Carolina statute, Connecticut has adopted
the continuous treatment rule.
In Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital35 the Connecticut Supreme Court
reaffirmed its approval of the continuous treatment rule.3 6 In Sherwood the
plaintiff received a blood transfusion during an operation performed by the
defendant in April 1985.37 The hospital had not tested the blood given for HIV
antibodies, and after the transfusion, the remaining blood in the facility had
been recalled to be tested." The plaintiff was never informed of the possibility
of postponing the surgery until the blood could be tested for the presence of

26. See Lane, 752 S.W.2d at 27.
27. See Nichols, supra note 24, at 413.
28. Lane, 752 S.W.2d at 28.
29. 252 S.E.2d 594 (Va. 1979).
30. Farley,252 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Note, Statute ofLimitations-CauseofAction for
MalpracticeAccrues at Termination of Treatment underDoctrine of "Continuous Treatment,
31 FoRD. L. REv. 842, 843 (1963)).
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203(a)-(b) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1999).
32. See Giambozi v. Peters, 16 A.2d 833, 835 (Conn. 1940), overruled by Foran v.
Carangelo, 216 A.2d 638, 640 (Conn. 1966) (overruling the allowance of "death and its direct
consequences" as recoverable damages when not specified by statute).
33. CoNN.GEN. STAT.ANN. § 52-584 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
34. See id.
35. 746 A.2d 730 (Conn. 2000).
36. Id. at 736.
37. Id. at 733.
38. Id.
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HIV nor of the possibility of contracting HIV from contaminated blood, even
after the hospital became aware of the possibility.39 In March 1995 the plaintiff
first learned she was infected with the HIV virus as a result of her 1985
transfusion.' In Sherwood the court held the continuous treatment doctrine
could be applied to toll the statute of repose within section 52-584 if the
plaintiff could establish a continuing duty on the part of the physician.4'
B. Rejection of the Continuous TreatmentRule
Some states reject the continuous treatment rule.42 Kansas, for example, has
expressly rejected the doctrine. 43 In Becker v. Floersch the Kansas Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiff's argument, which was that ignoring the continued
status of care under a physician would result in the court permitting "'doctors
and surgeons to escape the consequences of their negligent acts by simple
expedient of the statute of limitations."' 45 The court declined to "intrude on the
prerogatives of the legislature."' Since Becker, the Kansas courts have
routinely rejected the continuous treatment rule.47
InHillv.HaysO the Supreme Court of Kansas, affirming its rejection ofthe
continuous treatment doctrine, held "[1]imitations are created by statute and are
'
legislative, not judicial acts."49
In addition, the Hays court held that "the
enumeration by the legislature of specific exceptions to a statute of limitations
excludes all others by implication."" ° Not only did the Hays court defer to the

39. Id.
40. Id. at 733.
41. Sherwood, 746 A.2d at 736.
42. See 1 LOUISELL ET AL., supranote 2, 13.02[3], at 13-50 n.54 (listing jurisdictions
declining adoption of the rule).
43. See Becker v. Floersch, 110 P.2d 752, 754 (Kan. 1941).
44. 110 P.2d 752 (Kan. 1941).
45. Id. at 754.
46. Id. This case sounds in tragic comedy. The defendant doctor promised the plaintiff a
cure for abdominal pain within ten treatments, and in the end, the patient endured over ninety
treatments and lost the ability to bear children as a result of the doctor's treatments. Id. at 75254.
47. See P.W.P. v. L.S., 969 P.2d 896, 903-04 (Kan. 1998) (outlining the history of the
Kansas rejection of the continuous treatment doctrine to the present time).
48. 395 P.2d 298 (Kan. 1964).
49. Id. at 301; cf Schanilec v. Grand Forks Clinic, Ltd., 599 N.W.2d 253,255 (N.D. 1999)
(holding when a statute does not express the time when an action accrues, the determination is
for the court).
50. Hays, 395 P.2d at 301. Oddly enough, though, the Kansas court refused to adopt the
continuous treatment doctrine within the context of a medical malpractice action, the court
applied the continuous representation rule to toll the statue of limitations until the end of an
attorney-client relationship in legal malpractice actions. Bonin v.Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754, 774
(Kan. 1996).
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legislature, but its interpretation of legislative acts also leaves little room for
any judicially created exceptions. s '
Illinois is another jurisdiction that has declined to adopt the continuous
treatment rule. In Cunningham v. Huffman52 the Supreme Court of Illinois
expressly held that "[they] cannot adopt the continuous course of treatment
doctrine as formulated by the appellate court."s3 The appellate court had
applied the continuous course of treatment rule to toll the statute ofrepose for
the plaintiff's medical malpractice claims.' Though the issue was the
continuous treatment rule as applied to a statute of repose, the position of
Illinois is apparent as applied to the statute of limitations as well: "Had the
General Assembly intended the continuous course of treatment doctrine to be
the law of this State, it could have specifically provided so."' s
Though the Cunninghamcourt explicitly rejected the continuous course of
treatment rule, it did construe the statute of repose to allow the plaintiff to
pursue her cause of action.5 6 Cunninghamallows a plaintiff to circumvent the
statute of repose when there is "an ongoing course of continuous negligent
medical treatment.""7
C. Confusion
Although New York and Connecticut have clearly adopted the continuous
treatment rule and Kansas has decidedly rejected it, many states have not yet
clearly defined this area. s8 Therefore, adoption ofthe continuous treatment rule
in many jurisdictions remains an open question. For example, Maryland
maintains that it has not changed its position regarding the continuous treatment
rule, yet its courts have reached the same result under reasoning similar to if the
continuous treatment rule had been adopted. 9 In Hill v. Fitzgerald the
Maryland Court of Appeals determined that the continuous treatment rule did
not apply.' The Hill court held under Maryland Code section 5-109(a) 61that
the time of injury for commencement of the statute is the time of the negligent

51. See Hecht v. FirstNat'l Bank & Trust Co., 490 P.2d 649,656-57 (Kan. 1971) (holding
the continuous treatment doctrine is generally "a judicial effort to soften the harshness of the
statutory accrual rule existing in a particular jurisdiction").
52. 609 N.E.2d 321, 324 (Il1. 1993).
53. Id. The appellate court held "that in medical malpractice actions, the statute of repose
is triggered only on the last day of treatment, and if the treatment is for the same condition, there
is no requirement that the negligence be continuous throughout the treatment." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. See id.
57. Id. at 325.
58. See, e.g., Froysland v. Altenburg, 439 N.W.2d 797, 801 (N.D. 1989) (hinting at the
possibility of adoption but not at that time).
59. See Hill v. Fitzgerald, 501 A.2d 27,32 (Md. 1985).
60. Id. at 31-32.
61. MD.CODE ANN., Crs. &JuD. PRoc. § 5-109(a) (1998).
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act "coupled with some harm." 2 Under this approach, the statute may
commence to run before treatment ceases, and the continuous treatment rule
appears inapplicable.63
However, in Jones v. Speed" the Maryland Court of Appeals approved a
6s
result similar to the adoption of the continuous treatment rule. In Jones the
plaintiff asserted that each visit was "a separate medical injury."" Though the
court stated the "continuous course of treatment rule remains lifeless in
' the court went on to hold that the plaintiff could prove that the
Maryland,"67
physician committed separate acts of negligence during the course of
treatment." Similarly, in addition to allowing each visit to be considered a
potential claim, the Jones court may have extended the definition of injury "to
69
include the progression or worsening of a single condition." Though the
Maryland court did not acknowledge the potential ramifications of its holding,
the Jones case was a move toward a more favorable rule for medical
malpractice victims.
Another example of unclear precedent is Delaware.70 Delaware stresses its
disapproval of the continuous treatment rule, but its case law suggests
confusion on the issue.7' In Delaware, malpractice claims fall into one of two
statutory time limitations-two years from the date of injury or three years for
an "inherently unknowable" injury.72 In Ewing v. Beck the Supreme Court of
Delaware affirmed the lower court's holding that "since the continuing
treatment doctrine had not been enacted by the Delaware legislature or adopted
by this Court, the continuing treatment doctrine was not applicable and
' In examining the continuous treatment rule,
the... claims were time barred."73
the Delaware court engaged in a lengthy analysis of legislative intent and
requirements for alleging a claim based on a continuous course of negligent
treatment.74
Ultimately, the Delaware court held that an action does exist for continuous
negligent medical treatment.75 The court held that the claimant must allege such
a continuum of treatment "with particularity," but upon doing so, "the statute
of limitations runs for two years from the date of the last act in the negligent

62. Hill, 501 A.2d at 30.
63. See id. at 32.

64. Jones v. Speed, 577 A.2d 64 (Md. 1990).
65. Id. at 70.
66. Id. at 65.
67. Id. at 68.
68. Id. at 70.
69. Judith C. Ensor, Jones v. Speed: Redefining MedicalInjury in Medical Malpractice
Claims?, 2 MD. J.CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 11 (1991).
70. See Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653 (Del. 1987).
71. See id. at 656.
72. Id. at 659.
73. Id. at 656.

74. See id. at 659-61.

75. Id. at 664.
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continuum" prior to discovery. 6 In essence, the Delaware court adopted the
continuous treatment rule subject to the discovery rule but placed a high
standard of proof on the plaintiff to establish the existence of a continuous
treatment."
III. SOUTH CAROLINA BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework for Medical MalpracticeActions in South
Carolina
Before 1988 the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions was
six years." In 1988 the General Assembly amended the statute to its current
version:
[A]ny action.., to recover damages for injury to the person
arising out of any medical, surgical, or dental treatment,
omission, or operation... must be commenced within three
years from the date of the treatment, omission, or operation
giving rise to the cause of action or three years from [the]
date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been
discovered, not to exceed six years from [the] date of
occurrence, or as tolled by this section. 9
Thus, the present statute of limitations in South Carolina for medical
malpractice claims is three years from the date of the injury or from the date of
discovery, with a maximum of six years from the date of the injury."0
B. South CarolinaPrecedent
In 1996 the South Carolina Supreme Court decided a pair of cases, Preer
v. Mims and Anderson v. Short,both ofwhich concerned the shortened statute
of limitations and may have been decided differently under the former statute.8"
In Preer the patient sued his doctor claiming that because of the doctor's
76. Ewing, 520 A.2d at 664-65.
77. Id. at 665.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545(A) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1978).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545(A) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1999). The six-year limitation in
§ 15-3-545 is the repose period which places an outer limit on commencing actions. See supra
note 69.
80. 1977 S.C. Acts 182. South Carolina does not publish legislative history, so determining
the reason for the General Assembly's change in the existing statute is an onerous task if such
history is achievable at all. When the General Assembly amended the time limitation for medical
malpractice cases, other actions such as contract claims were also shortened from six to three
years. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-530-535 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
81. Preer v. Mims, 323 S.C. 516,476 S.E.2d 472 (1996); Anderson v. Short, 323 S.C. 522,
476 S.E.2d 475 (1996).
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negligence, he was addicted to a pain-relieving drug, 2 and the patient's wife
sued for loss of consortium."3 The doctor began seeing Preer in 1982 and
continued to prescribe the drug at Preer's request until 1991.8 The action was
commenced on April 29, 1993." The doctor moved for and was granted a
directed verdict on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of
rule tolled the statute
limitations." Preer alleged that the continuous treatment
7
of limitations and thereby made the action timely.
The Preercourt held that a decision on the continuous treatment rule was
unnecessary because even if it adopted the rule, Preer's claim would be limited
by the discovery rule. 8 In South Carolina, the discovery rule causes the statute
to start when "facts and circumstances of the injury would put a person of
common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of hers has been.
invaded or that some claim against a party might exist."8 9 As Preer should have
discovered the injury more than three years prior to the filling of the claim, the
claim was untimely.'
Like Preer,Anderson v. Short involved a patient and spouse who filed
claims for medical malpractice and loss of consortium, respectively. The
patient began seeing the doctor in 1983, and her treatment continued until
March 1991.9 In her claim filed on January 13, 1994, she alleged that she
became addicted to a prescription drug due to the doctor's negligence in
prescribing the drug.' The action was filed within three years from the last
treatment by the doctor and, therefore, would not have been barred if the statute
of limitations was tolled until the cessation of the treatment.
However, the Anderson court affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the
action because Anderson conceded that she had discovered the addiction more
than three years prior to the filing of the action.94 In dicta, the Anderson court
clarified its proposed position regarding the continuous treatment rule: "If the
continuous treatment rule with the above-discussed discovery exception were
82. Preer,323 S.C. at 517-18, 476 S.E.2d at 472-73.
83. Id. at 518, 476 S.E.2d at 473.
84. Id. at 517, 476 S.E.2d at 472. During this time, Preer was also receiving prescriptions
for the drug from other doctors. Id.
85. Id. at 518, 476 S.E.2d at 473.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Preer,323 S.C. at 520, 476 S.E.2d at474. But cf Otto v. Nat'l Inst. of Health, 815 F.2d
985, 988 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that under federal law, the discovery of "both the existence and

the cause of [the] injury" starts the running of the statute of limitations).
89. Arant v. Kressler, 327 S.C. 225,229,489 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1997).

90. Preer,323 S.C. at 520, 476 S.E.2d at 474. The Preercourt reversed the directed verdict
for the loss of consortium claim because under § 15-75-20 a claim for loss of consortium is not
derivative. Id. at 521,476 S.E.2d at 474.
91. 323 S.C. 522, 524, 476 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1996).
92. Id. at 523, 476 S.E.2d at 476.
93. Id. at 524, 476 S.E.2d at 476.
94. Id. at 525, 476 S.E.2d at 477. The dismissal of the loss of consortium action was
affirmed because the husband failed to properly appeal the rulings unlike the wife in Preer.Id.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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the law in South Carolina, it would not be used to toll the accrual of a medical
malpractice action for patients who discovered their injury giving rise to a
cause of action during treatment.""5
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court did not adopt the continuous
treatment rule in either case, the Court of Appeals reached a different
conclusion in Dunbarv. Carlson,' a case similar to Preerand Anderson. In
Dunbarthe court upheld a claim for medical malpractice based on a continuous
relationship between a patient and her dentist without adopting the continuous
treatment rule.97 The patient, Dunbar, started seeing her dentist, Carlson, in
1983 and continued to see him until June 24, 1994.9 On September 26, 1995,
Dunbar filed an action alleging that Carlson negligently failed to diagnose or
treat Dunbar for periodontal disease.? During the trial, Dunbar's daughter
stated that she had become concerned about Carlson's treatment of her mother
as early as 1992."ee After this testimony, Carlson moved to amend his answer
to include defenses based on the statute of repose and the statute of
limitations."0 ' Defense counsel asserted that "South Carolina does not recognize
the continuous treatment rule."'0 2 On the other hand, the plaintiff argued that
there were negligent acts or omissions that did occur during the statutory period
even if the initial negligence began at an earlier time."
The Court ofAppeals affirmed the lower court's denial of the defendant's
request to amend his answer to include a statute of repose defense because
under the facts ofthis case, the denial was not an abuse ofdiscretion by the trial
judge1' 4 In addition, the court reversed the lower court's grant of the
defendant's request to amend his answer to include a statute of limitations
defense because it was "improvidently granted."'0 5 By denying the defendant's
request to amend his answer to include afffimative defenses, the Dunbarcourt
moved toward the equitable result that the continuous treatment rule would
have provided by recognizing that the doctor's initial failure did not terminate
his duty to act with due care during the subsequent visits with the patient.

95. Id.
96. 341 S.C. 261, 533 S.E.2d 913 (Ct. App. 2000).
97. Id. at 270-71, 533 S.E.2d at 918. Similarly, Georgia based rulings on reasons other than
the continuous treatment rule to uphold claims. Vitner v. Miller, 430 S.E.2d 671,672 (Ga. App.
1993). However, Chief Judge Pope's concurrence strongly urged the court to adopt the
continuous treatment rule. Id. at 673. Georgia subsequently adopted the continuous treatment
rule. Williams v. Young, No. A00A1393, 2000 WL 1770056, at *5 (Ga. Ct. App. Dec. 1,2000).
98. Dunbar,341 S.C. at 264, 533 S.E.2d at 914.
99. Id.at 264, 533 S.E.2d at 915.
100. Id.at 265, 533 S.E.2d at 915.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 270, 533 S.E.2d at 918.
103. Id.
104. Dunbar,341 S.C. at 271,533 S.E.2d at 917.
105. Id. at 268.
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IV. ANALYSIS

A.

Argumentsfor Strict Interpretationsof Statutes ofLimitations

The states which have allowed the use of the continuous treatment rule or
a de facto version of the rule have often done so based on notions of fairness
or "corrective justice."''" Those jurisdictions where the doctrine has been
rejected have based their decisions on legislative intent and the protective
purpose of the statute of limitations. 7
Statutes of limitations are a source of protection both for potential
defendants and for the efficiency of the judicial system, and there are strong
arguments for limiting liability through strict interpretations of the statutes of
limitations."" s One traditional view is that "[s]tatutes of limitation are an
integral part of our judicial system and are grounded in policy considerations
including affording defendants the chance to defend themselves, protecting
defendants from the prolonged fear of litigation, and preventing stale
claims."'" In addition, the nature of the health care industry offers another
reason for limiting the ability of potential victims to sue-malpractice

106. See F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERTL. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS

4-6 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that compensation of victims is not a goal of the tort system, but is a
means ofaccomplishing a goal like deterrence or corrective justice); see also Learner, supranote
9, at 166 (stating that compensation of victims by the wrongdoerwas the basis for common-law
tort remedies, but the modem focus is on deterrence).
107. As stated earlier, courts have rejected the doctrine out of deference to the legislature
where the court found that it was for the legislature to change the statute to incorporate an
exception. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
108. See Nichols, supranote 24, at 408; see also McEntire v. Malloy, 707 S.W.2d 773,776
(Ark. 1986) (noting that the statutes of limitations ensure prompt filing of claims and protect
defendants from an evidentiary process tainted by time). Another mechanism for protecting
potential defendants is a statute of repose. Section 15-3-545 of South Carolina's Code contains
both a limitation of actions period and a repose period. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1999). A statute of repose differs from a statute of limitations in that the statute of repose
dictates an absolute time period in which a claim must be brought, and the exceptions applicable
to statutes of limitations are not extended to statutes of repose. "A statute of repose generally
begins to run at an earlier date and runs for a longer period oftime than the otherwise applicable
statute of limitations unaffected by the discovery accrual rule." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSERAND KEETONONTHELAWOFTORTS § 30 at 168 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSERAND
KEETON ON TORTS] (footnote omitted). The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the
tolling provisions applicable to the statute of limitations in medical malpractice claims do not
toll the statute of repose for those actions. Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401,405,438 S.E.2d 242,
244 (1993); see also HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 106, at 32 n.32 (stating the statute of
limitations and statute of repose are distinguished based on the type of right conveyed by each
statute); cf.George, supra note 6, at 693 (stating the statute of limitations and statute of repose
are distinguished on the basis of the date of commencement for accrual of an action).
109. Robert C. Jarosh, Note, Torts/Wrongful Death-Should a Wrongful Death Action
Expire Before the Decedent Does?A Wrong Turnfor Wrongful Death. Edwards v. Fogarty, 962
P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1998), 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 235,251-52 (2000).
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insurance costs."' Lastly, statutes of limitations provide a service to the judicial
system by ensuring that potential plaintiffs act promptly in asserting potential
claims and helping to keep the proverbial floodgates of litigation under
control."'
B. Argumentsfor LiberalInterpretationsof Statutes ofLimitations and
for Adoption ofthe Continuous TreatmentRule
Though statutes of limitations protect potential defendants and promote the
efficiency of judicial system, courts are sensitive to other concerns. Within the
tort system, fairness is a powerful idea hinging on the notion that wrongdoers
should "'correct' their wrong by restoring the victim to his prior status.""'
Although fairness must also be extended to potential wrongdoers, the
reluctance to prejudice a possible defendant must be weighed against the
position ofthe potential victim.' Strict interpretations of statutes of limitations
may lead to unfair prejudice and the denial of rights to a medical malpractice
victim."' As a result of "apparent injustice," many courts have adopted
"various devices to circumvent" such strict rules."' The continuous treatment
rule is a device to achieve such an end.
In addition to the fairness considerations and deference to the legislative
intent of limiting exposure of medical professionals, deterrence is another
policy consideration that impacts the tort system andjudicial determinations." 6
The theory is premised on the idea that by making a potential tortfeasor liable
for her actions, that person will be deterred from engaging in tortious

110. See Christopher J. Trombetta, Note, The UnconstitutionalityofMedicalMalpractice
Statutes of Repose: JudicialConscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 VILL. L. REV. 397, 427
n.166 (1989). The argument that medical malpractice insurance costs are unfair to physicians
must be kept in context. The amount paid for insurance may be a large sum, but the amount paid
constitutes a small portion of a health care provider's gross income. In 1986, malpractice
insurance was approximately 3.7% of a physician's gross income, 0.7% lower than in 1976 and
1979. Id.
S11.See HUBBARD &FELIX, supra note 106, at 22-23 (discussing the effect of statutes of
limitations in helping to ease the burdens on the courts).
112. Id. at 6.
113. Id. at 14-15.
114. See Trombetta, supranote 110, at 403 (noting the "manifest unfairness that early
medical malpractice statutes of limitations produced").
115. PROSSERANDKEToNoNToRTs,supra note 108, at 166; see also Crosby v. Glasscock
Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 641, 532 S.E.2d 856,863 (2000) (Toal, J., dissenting) (arguing for
imposition of liability for a fetal wrongful death as consistent with "recent decisions follow[ing]
a trend of abolishing well-established tort doctrines which inhibit the proper apportioning of
liability based on fault"); Nichols, supra note 24, at 406 (stating the increased frequency of court
intervention to prevent injustice to medical malpractice victims).
116. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 106, at 6-10. Professors Hubbard and Felix list
other policy considerations which are not discussed in this Comment, but these considerations
may also be relevant to the future of the continuous treatment rule. Id.
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conduct."' Also, imposing liability on wrongdoers promotes other aspects of
the tort system-efficiency of the system" s and spreading of loss." 9
The continuous treatment rule fosters deterrence in at least two different
ways. First, under the present law in South Carolina, a negligent health care
provider might not be liable if her negligent acts began more than three years
before the action." Under the continuous treatment rule, a physician who
continues to engage in negligent conduct does not escape liability merely
because the first negligent act occurred more than three years ago. This aspect
of the rule also plays into the fairness considerations to potential victims.
Second, the continuous treatment rule allows a physician to cure any
negligent act or omission before imposing liability.' The physician can
"correct the injury and avoid potential malpractice actions."'" In this respect,
fairness also promotes giving a physician the chance to undo a wrong or
encouraging a physician to attempt to undo wrongs whether known to the
physician or not. This is not to say that a physician will necessarily be
cognizant of a wrong, but the rule accepts the reality that physicians make
mistakes. Even in a highly skilled profession, there will be mistakes.' This
scenario is distinctly different from claims against physicians for fraudulent
concealment.' 2 ' The physician is in the best position to make such corrections
and should be allowed to do so."z In the alternative, the physician's "[f]ailure
to repair the original damage provides the rationale for tolling the statute."'26
A third benefit of the continuous treatment rule is that it serves a purpose
unique to the relationship between physician and patient by fostering that

117. See HUBBARD&FELIX, supra note 106, at 6;see also Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med.
Ctr., 341 S.C. 32, 49, 533 S.E.2d 312, 321 (2000) (holding that an "aspect of tort law" is "the
desire to give parties with crucial duties a keen incentive to do everything possible to avoid
violating those duties"); Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479,487,234 S.E.2d
873, 877 (1977) (holding that "[i]mmunity fosters neglect and irresponsibility, while liability
encourages the exercise of due care").
118. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 106, at 6-10 (outlining "efficient accident
prevention" which in its simplest form makes accident costs to the wrongdoer greater than the
costs of preventing the accident).
119. See Brown, 268 S.C. at 486, 234 S.E.2d at 876 (holding there is a "'legislative and
judicial policy in distributing losses' (quoting President and Directors of Georgetown College

v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
120. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545(A) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1999).
12 1. See I LoUIsFLL ET AL., supra note 2, 13.02[3], at 13-52.
122. Nichols, supra note 24, at 408.
123. See Oliver v. Kaiser Cmty. Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ohio 1983)
(discussing the "'ordinary and usual mistakes incident to even skilled surgery' (quoting Bowers
v. Santee, 124 N.E. 238 (Ohio 1919))).
124. See 61 AM. JuR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 322 (1981 & Supp. 2000)
(discussing the general rule that statutes of limitations are tolled until a patient discovers a
negligent act that the physician fraudulently concealed).
125. See I LOUISELL ETAL., supra note 2, 13.02[3], at 13-52.
126. Horton v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 472 S.E.2d 778, 782 (N.C. 1996); see cases cited
supra note 117.
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relationship.'27 A patient may continue to see a doctor and receive treatment
without losing her recourse if that treatment is negligently performed.'
Unfortunately, there seems to be a rise in the type of illnesses and injuries that
require long term care, such as cancer, and any interruption in that course of
treatment would be harmful to that patient. It is illogical and inefficient to
expect a patient to cease treatment to pursue a potential claim or to pursue a
claim while continuing treatment or to expect a patient to be able to ascertain
that the physician may be the cause of the harm. 29 In addition, patients are not
necessarily trained as medical experts and lack the knowledge to question or
even understand a physician's chosen course of treatment. A patient should
have the right to place confidence in her physician without having to worry
about a forfeiture of remedy if that confidence was ill-placed.
The continuous treatment rule, as an exception to the statute of limitations,
furthers not only the physician-patient relationship, but it also comports with
tort law policies that justify placing liability on a wrongdoer once it has been
determined that there has been a wrong. 3 Adoption of the continuous
treatment rule furthers the goals of tort law more efficiently than strict
interpretations of statutes of limitations by helping to place the victim in the
same position that she could have been in but for the negligence *ofthe
physician by making the physician liable (corrective justice), by deterring
negligence, and by averring the need to correct a wrong.
C. Implementation Obstacles
In addition to weighing the policy considerations by balancing the interests
of potential defendants, potential victims, and judicial economy, further
concerns should be considered. If the South Carolina Supreme Court were to
adopt the continuous treatment rule, there would be difficulties in defining the
application and scope of the rule to give clear guidance to practitioners. The
court must clearly articulate the requirements that must be met to invoke the
rule to ensure an optimal result.' The court may refine the requirements by
expressly determining what constitutes "continuity" and "termination" of
treatment and determining how the discovery rule is to be applied.'32
127. See Nichols, supranote 24, at 408.
128. See id.
129. See Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 519-20 (Iowa 1995).
130. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supranote 106, at 17-18 & 18 n.64"(emphasizing the primary
step of ascertaining a legally recognizable wrong before determining liability).
131. See Nichols, supra note 24, at 415 (illustrating the confusion when courts do not
clearly define the parameters of the rule).
132. See, e.g., J.R. Zepkin, Virginia's ContinuingNegligent Treatment Rule: Farley v.
Goode andFenton v. Danaceau, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 231,239-44 (1981) (discussing unanswered
questions left by the Virginia Supreme Court after adopting the continuous treatment rule); see
also I LOUISELL ET AL., supra note 2, 13.02[3], at 13-46-13-59 (stating courts distinguish
between cessation of treatment and cessation of the physician-patient relationship.); Nichols,
supranote 24, at 415 (stating that after Arkansas adopted continuous treatment rule question of
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1. Continuous
As the South Carolina Supreme Court sets out to define the parameters of
the continuous treatment rule, it must be aware of the problems that have arisen
in other jurisdictions. First, courts have had problems defining continuous."' 3
Defining continuous may result in effectuating the protective purpose of
statutes of limitations or allowing legitimate claims to be brought against
defendants whose conduct needs to be scrutinized because the particular facts
of each case will dictate whether the treatment was continuous."M In defining
the continuity of the treatment, the court may choose to concentrate on the
nature of the illness and the relationship between the physician and patient, or
the court may focus on the actual time elements surrounding the treatment. 3
Some courts have held that when the length of time between visits or
treatments is longer than the applicable statute of limitations, then the treatment
was not continuous. 36 In somejurisdictions, the issue of whether the treatment
was continuous is a question for the jury. 37 Yet, in other jurisdictions, the
courts have been extremely liberal in applying the continuous treatment rule by
allowing recovery when a negligent act is followed by subsequent visits that
were not negligent. 38 Courts that focus on the nature of the relationship
between the physician and patient may concentrate on whether the physician
owed a continued duty of care to the patient after the negligent act. 39 Though
the approaches vary significantly, focusing on the treatment and the actions
taken in conjunction with the treatment seems to be the most predictable and
fair approach. One significant advantage of the continuous treatment rule is that
it allows a patient to continue a course of treatment without interruption or
interrogation of the physician." In addition, the opportunity for the physician
to correct any wrongs in the course of treatment is eliminated when the
treatment ceases. Also, because a physician-patient relationship may span a

"whether statute will be tolled if there is only a single negligent act, rather than a series of
negligent acts" was left unanswered).
133. See Peck, supra note 17, at 73-76 (acknowledging the difficulties associated with
defining continuous).
134. Seeid. at76.
135. See id. at 73-76.
136. See Collins v. Sullivan, 679 N.E.2d 423, 425 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that nine
years between visits did not constitute continuous treatment even when visits were prompted by
same illness or condition).
137. See Jones v. Neuroscience Assocs., Inc., 827 P.2d 51, 59 (Kan. 1992) (holding the
plaintiff must be afforded the right to establish the existence of a continuous treatment by a trier
of fact).
138. See O'Laughlin v. Salamanca Hosp. Dist. Auth., 319 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130-31 (1971);
Borgia v. City of N.Y., 187 N.E.2d 777, 779 (N.Y. 1962).
139. See Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 746 A.2d 730,736 (Conn. 2000) (stating the duty
must have continued after the negligent act).
140. See Borgia, 187 N.E.2d at 779 (noting the absurdity in expecting a patient to interrupt
treatment).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 955

person's life, it would be illogical to hold a physician liable for a misdiagnosis
made when the adult patient was a child.' 4'
2. Date ofAccrual
A court must decide at which point the continuous treatment rule ceases to
toll the statute of limitations. The two obvious options are the last date of the
"continuous" treatment or the termination of the physician-patient
relationship. 4 ' The better approach seems to be the one taken by the Borgia
court which held that it is the continuous "treatment for the same or related
illnesses or injuries, continuing after the alleged acts of malpractice, not mere
continuity of a general physician-patient relationship."'" 3
3. Interactingwith the Discovery Rule
Another issue to be addressed if the continuous treatment rule is adopted
is how it should interact with the discovery rule. The discovery rule is another
tool which the courts use to toll statutes of limitations.'" The discovery rule
and the continuous treatment rule could be used coextensively or merged
together. As already implied by the South Carolina Supreme Court inAnderson
v. Short, the discovery rule would apply even if the continuous treatment rule
were adopted. 4 ' This position is in accord with many of the otherjurisdictions
adopting the continuous treatment rule.'" However, the discovery rule has
inherent problems that the continuous treatment rule purports to assuage
because it is precisely the nature of the physician-patient relationship as an
impediment to a patient's ability to detect negligence on the part of her
physician which makes the continuous treatment rule appealing. 47 In addition,
due to the continuous nature of particular treatments, the date of the tortious
conduct or injury may not be ascertainable at all.'" Another concern is the

141. See id. (acknowledging the possibility of a patient bringing a lawsuit years after an
illness but avoiding such a pitfall because the treatment must be for the same illness not "any
kind of illness").
142. See Zepkin, supranote 132, at 240-42 (discussing the question of the date of accrual
left unanswered by the Virginia courts).
143. Borgia, 187 N.E.2d at 779; see also I LOUISELL ETAL., supra note 2, 13.02 (citing
to jurisdictions that set accrual at the termination of the treatment).
144. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 108, at 165-67 (noting the
"infectious" spread of the discovery rule).
145. See Anderson v. Short, 323 S.C. 522, 525, 476 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1996).
146. See Nichols, supra note 24, at 408-09 (asserting most jurisdictions adopting the
continuous treatment rule apply it to toll the statute of limitations until discovery).
147. See Collins v. Wilson, 984 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1999).
148. See Cheryl A. Fisher, Comment, Is There Light at the End of the Tunnel? Putting a
Stop to the Controversy of Which Statute ofLimitationsto Use in a MedicalMalpracticeAction
in Texas: Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1995), 22 T. MARSHALL L. RV.346, 356
(1997).
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potential and probable lack of medical knowledge on the part of the patient
which would impair the patient's ability to second guess the physician's
actions." The injury could be the culmination of many acts, some negligent
and some not. In summary, the discovery rule does not adequately address the
unique complexities surrounding the physician-patient relationship. s The
patient may see the physician as a source of hope during a long battle with
cancer. This situation cannot be measured by a reasonable person standard
because it is almost impossible to understand what one would do to survive
until one is in that situation.
4. Possible ConstitutionalChallenges
Another source of controversy arises from potential constitutional
challenges to statutes of limitations at both the state and federal levels. Most of
the challenges predicated on a violation of the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution have failed due to the level of scrutiny that the United States
Supreme Court applies to such challenges.' 5 '
While it appears that courts and legislatures would be insulated from any
federal constitutional challenge for declining to adopt the continuous treatment
rule, it may be that the failure to adopt the rule could be considered
unconstitutional at the state level.' 5 2 State challenges to the constitutionality of
limitations on a patient's right to a remedy have been more successful than
federal challenges.' 53 State challenges are broadened to utilize guarantees in
state constitutions beyond those inherent in the United States Constitution." 4
These additional guarantees include equal protection, due process, open courts,
and right-to-a-remedy provisions in the various state constitutions.' 55 The
argument is that it is unconstitutional to "discriminate against only a few
149. See Peck, supranote 17, at 69-71.
150. There is another complexity left unaddressed in this Comment-the role of health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs). HMOs and
PPOs may also play a role in encouraging adoption of the continuous treatment rule because they
may impair a patient's ability to seek effective treatment. Even if a patient were to suspect a
physician's actions, the patient may not be permitted under her healthcare plan to seek a second
opinion or to change physicians. See generally Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen,
Emerging Theoriesof Liability in the ManagedHealth Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285,
287-88, 294-95, 311, 325 (1995) (outlining the roles of IMOs and PPOs as well as the
expanding theories of liability, in particular those predicated on limiting a patient's freedom of
choice and denial of proposed medical treatment); William A. Chittenden, HI, Malpractice
Liabilityand ManagedHealth Care: History andPrognosis,26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451,476-85
(1991) (discussing potential liability stemming from the cost-containment systems employed by
HMOs and PPOs).
151. See Trombetta, supra note 110, at 407-09.
152. See id. at 407.
153. See id. at409.
154. Seeid. at409-11.
155. See id.
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malpractice plaintiffs."' 56 The argument is bolstered by the fact that such a
limitation on such a small number of potential plaintiffs and damage awards
"could not possibly have any meaningful impact on the medical malpractice
insurance industry."'" The challenges at the state level offer little guidance,
though some have been successful.
There seems to be little prospect of a challenge to the constitutionality of
a statute of limitations under the South Carolina Constitution in light of the
present disposition of the South Carolina Supreme Court regarding statutes of
repose. The South Carolina Supreme Court has already upheld the
constitutionality ofthe statute of repose for medical malpractice claims in Smith
v. Smith 5 ' under an equal protection challenge. Deferring to the General
Assembly, the court looked for "'any reasonable hypothesis"' to support the
legislature's actions. 5 9 The test that the court employed is as follows: "[t]he
requirements of equal protection are satisfied if 1) the classification bears a
reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected; 2) the
members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and
conditions; and 3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis."''" Under
the reasonable basis scrutiny, the Smith court found a reasonable relationship
between the statute and the legislative intent to protect health care providers.' 6'
V.

CONCLUSION

Simply put, "it is unfair to bar a legitimate claim because of the patient's
trust in the physician or the latent nature of the injury."' 62 South Carolina courts
will eventually address cases requiring a definitive position on the continuous
treatment rule. 63 In the past, the South Carolina Supreme Court has been able
to dispense justice without adopting the rule, deciding the few relevant cases
on other grounds.'" Although many jurisdictions have declined to accept the
rule based on deference to the legislature, the courts often face issues before
they have been brought to the attention of the legislature. Though it would be
better for the General Assembly to amend the statute of limitations to include
a tolling provision for continuous treatment, a case may soon arise which calls

156. 1 LOUISELL ET AL., supra note 2, 13.02[2][b], at 13-40 (noting Washington has
already held that the statute of repose was unconstitutional).
157. Id. at 13-41.
158. 291 S.C. 420, 424-25, 354 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1987).
159. Id. at 424, 354 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting Gary Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Riley, 285 S.C.
498, 331 S.E.2d 335 (1985)).
160. Id. (quoting Gary Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Riley, 285 S.C. 498, 331 S.E.2d 335
(1985)).
161. Id. at 424-25, 354 S.E.2d at 39.
162. Nichols, supranote 24, at 408.
163. See Horton v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 472 S.E.2d 778,781 (N.C. 1996) (holding that
the continuous treatment rule is to be the law in that jurisdiction).
164. See Preerv. Mines, 323 S.C. 516,520,476 S.E.2d 472,474 (1996); Anderson v. Short,
323 S.C. 522,525-26,476 S.E.2d 475,477(1996).
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for an immediate application to avoid dismissing the only recourse that a victim
may have.6 ' Further, the legislature may notbe forced to address the issue soon
because potential victims are unidentifiable, and thus, no lobby of individuals
who might someday be the victim of medical malpractice during a continuous
course of treatment exists.
The ramifications of the continuous treatment rule, ifadopted, could spread
to many other areas in which a professional relationship exists.1 In fact, the
District of Columbia applied the continuous treatment rule to medical
malpractice after it adopted the rule for legal malpractice claims. 67 Thus, the
adoption of the continuous treatment rule may have wide-spread effects.
The justifications for adopting a rule that would allow the victims of
lengthy medical negligence the opportunity to seek a remedy exceed the
justifications for strict adherence to prior interpretations of the statute of
limitations, such as the need to protect the medical profession from an
insurance crisis. The benefit to the limited number of potential claimants could
be immeasurable while imposing aminimalburden onpotential defendants and
their insurance companies. Not only should fairness dictate the adoption ofthe
continuous treatment rule, but the rule itself canbe framed in a manner that will
insure it is not abused by potential claimants that could have filed their claims
but waited needlessly. The court itself has the tools necessary to prevent
claimants' abuse of the continuous treatment rule while insuring that
malpractice victims with valid claims would have a recourse that they may not
presently have.
Melanie Fitzgerald

165. See Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479,486,234 S.E.2d 873,876
(1977) (stating courts should not legislate, but should they need to do so, then it ."should be wise
and safe" (quoting Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 39, 81 S.E. 512, 517 (1914))).
166. See Nichols, supra note 24, at 414 (stating that the continuous treatment rule has been
extended to lawyers, accountants, insurance brokers, and architects).
167. See Anderson v. George, 717 A.2d 876, 878 (D.C. 1998).
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